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What Goes Down May Come Up: Public Bond Issuers
Facing Soaring Interest Rates Turn to Chapter 3 for Relief
Ira Steinberg
Code Section Affected
Government Code § 5925 (new).
SB 344 (Machado); 2008 STAT. Ch. 3.
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of Chapter 3 is a cautionary tale of how failures in one corner of
the securities market can have far-ranging consequences.' In the era of subprime
and variable-rate mortgages, investment banks and financiers started slicing and
dicing debt and offering it in increasingly complex forms, leading many to
borrow without an accurate understanding of the risks involved.2 Governments,
and the myriad of agencies that comprise governments, could not escape the lure
of innovative and non-traditional methods of debt financing that promised cheap
and easy money.' Seeking ever-decreasing interest rates on their debt,
governments and agencies issued new and increasingly complex types of bonds,
and for a period, realized the low interest rates they were seeking.4 But nothing
lasts forever.
As the subprime mortgage crisis threw financial markets into turmoil,
municipalities and public agencies across California and the nation faced difficult
decisions In the boardroom of the Bay Area Toll Authority (BATA), the reality
1. See Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Municipalities Feel Pinch as Another Debt Market Falters, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C1 ("The failed auctions are tied to and exacerbating the larger problems in the
financial markets.").
2. See generally Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, U.S. Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime Loans, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 12, 2008, available at http://www.iht.comarticles/2008/02/121business/l12credit.php?
page=l (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that many people are defaulting on complex loans that
were once thought to be a safe investment).
3. See Michael B. Marois, Alabama, California Failures Expose Muni 'Dark Side', BLOOMBERG, Mar.
19, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.comapps/news?pid=20601109&sid=auMoiFGIT5o&refer=home (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (affirming the "expensive lesson" local governments are learning).
4. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 19, 2008).
5. See generally Letter from David J. Slawson, President, E. Mun. Water Dist. & Anthony J. Pack, Gen.
Manager, E. Mun. Water. Dist., to Mike Machado, Senator, Cal. State Senate (Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter
EMWD Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that bond costs must be reduced to assure
EMWD can maintain vital services without raising rates); Rich Saskal, California Issuers Eve New ARS
Strategies, BOND BUYER, Mar. 7, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.comprintthis.html?id=2008030695FQWXVY
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that agencies are under pressure to cope with rising
interest rates).
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of a financial "tsunami" finally confronted the board.6 Interest rates on the bonds
they issued skyrocketed, stressing the ability of the BATA and similar agencies
to continue servicing their debt without raising fees or cutting services. BATA
officials concluded that they would need to refinance their debt to take $720
million of auction rate bonds off the market until the situation stabilized.! BATA
executive director Steve Heminger described the market as "structurally broken
with little chance of correction." 9 Municipalities and agencies sought to
temporarily repurchase their bonds, but wanted to ensure the bonds would still
represent outstanding debt that could be restructured and resold when the market
improved.'" Senator Machado introduced Chapter 3 to assure governments and
agencies that they retained the flexibility to buy back or restructure their bonds
without extinguishing the debt."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Financial Background
State and local governments, as well as agencies, commonly offer bonds as a
way of raising capital that can be paid off over an extended period. For a long
period of time, governments only issued fixed-rate bonds. 2 A fixed-rate bond's
interest rate is set when the bond is issued and remains the same for the life of the
bond, which usually lasts thirty years or more. '3 However, in the last two
decades, municipalities and public agencies began issuing variable-rate bonds.
4
Unlike fixed-rate bonds, the interest rate on variable-rate bonds can float up or
down in accordance with the market and the terms of the contract for the issuance
of the bonds. 5
6. Saskal, supra note 5; Michael McDonald, Auction Supply 'Tsunami' Portends Municipal Losses,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=atxaBnNonAql (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the auction failures as a "tsunami").
7. See Saskal, supra note 5 (claiming that debt restructuring is needed to avoid raising toll fees to
maintain current level of services).
8. See id. (discussing BATA's role in refinancing the debt).
9. Id.
10. Letter from Bill Lockyer, Treasurer, Cal. State, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, Cal. State
(Mar. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Lockyer Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. See id. (urging the Governor to sign the bill to ensure bond issuers have the ability to repurchase
bonds); Letter from Michael Machado, Senator, Cal. State Senate, to Hector De La Torre, Assembly Member,
Cal. State Assembly (Mar. 3, 2008) [hereinafter De La Torre Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(requesting to add the urgency clause to the bill).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344. at 2 (Mar. 5,
2008).
13. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008).
14. Id.
15. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344. at 2-3 (Mar. 5,
2008) (noting that interest rates fluctuate with the market and are often capped by contract).
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Until recently, variable-rate bonds seemed mutually advantageous for both
investors and issuers.16 Money market funds and large investors sought out
municipal bonds because they presented a safe, liquid, and tax-exempt
investment. '7 Bond issuers took advantage of the high demand by paying reduced
interest rates and thus reducing their borrowing cost.'" However, the credit crisis,
created by problems in the mortgage market, spilled over and affected two types
of variable-rate bonds issued by municipalities and public agencies: variable-rate
demand bonds and auction-rate securities. 9
Variable-rate demand bonds (VRDBs) have variable interest rates which are
reset at regular intervals by an investment bank (often called a remarketing agent)
to ensure sufficient demand to purchase the supply of bonds on the market. ° The
remarketing agent's goal is to set the interest rate low enough to reduce the costs
of the issuers, but high enough to assure a return to investors sufficient to create
demand for all the outstanding bonds.2' If there is insufficient demand to
purchase all the bonds, the remarketing agent can either purchase the bonds itself
or sell them to a bank paid to "backstop" the bonds.2 ' The bond's terms usually
specify that if a bond is sold to a backstop bank, the interest rate automatically
increases as a payment for backstopping the bond.2' As of March 2008, there
were approximately forty billion dollars in outstanding VRDBs in California. 2
Auction-rate securities (ARS) differ from VRDBs in that a remarketing agent
does not independently set the interest rate. ' Instead, auctions are held at fixed
intervals and the interest rate is determined by the outcome of these auctions 6 As
a general rule, the higher the demand for ARS, the lower the interest rate drops,
as buyers compete to offer the issuer the best deal. Correspondingly, the lower
the demand, the higher the interest rate rises to entice buyers to purchase the
outstanding bonds, and also the higher the chances of a failed auction if
16. See Marois, supra note 3 (stating that cities were led to believe that low interest rates were available
with little risk through variable-rate bonds); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 19,
2008) ("Marketplace demand for variable rate bonds has traditionally been very high .....
17. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 19, 2008).
18. Letter from Jim Wiltshire, Deputy Dir., Cal. Ass'n of Counties, to Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor, Cal. State (Mar. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Wiltshire Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
("[Tihe variable-rate bond market . . . has been a reliable source of low-interest borrowing for local
governments for many years....").





24. Lockyer Letter, supra note 10.
25. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 4 (Mar. 19, 2008) (noting that the interest




ultimately all the bonds cannot be sold.25 When an auction fails to sell all the
bonds, not only are holders stuck with bonds they cannot sell, but the bonds'
interest rate rises pursuant to the bonds' terms.29 As of March 2008, there were
approximately twenty-eight billion dollars in outstanding ARS in California.0
The trouble for variable-rate markets began when bond insurers became
caught up in the mortgage meltdown." Variable-rate bonds are insured against
default and depend heavily on their insurer's good rating to maintain high
demand.3 2 Under Rule 2a-7 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
money market funds, which had commonly held up to seventy percent of their
value in municipal variable-rate bonds, can only hold bonds rated AA or higher
on a scale of AAA (the highest) to D (the lowest). 3  As the mortgage crisis
slammed companies insuring mortgage-based securities, their ratings were
reduced, chilling demand and making investors hesitant to purchase variable-rate
bonds.34
As the decline in demand worsened, ARS auctions began to fail and
remarketing agents began to exercise their contractual rights to force backstop
banks to purchase unsold VRDBs.35 Failures in the variable-rate bond market
called into question the previously unquestioned liquidity of variable-rate
bonds. 36 Many purchasers invested in variable-rate bonds specifically because
they considered them safe and liquid. 7 Therefore, as investors lost confidence in
the liquidity of variable-rate bonds, money market funds and corporations that
28. Id.
29. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 4 (Mar. 5,
2008).
30. Lockyer Letter, supra note 10.
31. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 5,
2008).
32. Id. (stating that a bond's rating typically comes from the rating of the bond insurer, which is rated
based on its fiscal stability).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008). Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-I et seq.
(2006), the Department of the Treasury has the authority to promulgate regulations of money market funds such
as the one at issue. Bonds and bond insurance is rated by several high profile firms including Standard and
Poor's and Moody's. For a basic introduction to bond ratings, the ratings scale, and how ratings are assigned,
see STANDARD & POOR'S, GLIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2009), http://www2.standardandpoors.
com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SPCreditRatingsGuide.pdf. See also Liz Rappaport, New Monkey, Same Backs:
Another Debt Market for Government Loses Buyers, and Rates Rise, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2008, at C1 ("Many
such funds have 70% or more of their assets invested in [variable-rate demand notesl.").
34. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 5,
2008).
35. Michael McDonald, Auction Bond Failures Near 70lc; No Sign of Abating, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5,
2008, http://www.bloomberg.comapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aamTy2dyu.U8 (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (there were thirteen auction failures between 1984 and 2006, and 536 in a single day in
early March); Rappaport, supra note 33 (remarketing agents began putting bonds to backstop banks in February
2008).
36. See generally Gretchen Morgensen, As Good as Cash. Until It's Not, N.Y. TIwEs, Mar. 9. 2008
(stating that investors found variable-rate bonds less liquid as they previously thought).
37. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 19. 2008).
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relied on the liquidity of the bonds to maintain the availability of cash fled the
market." Exemplifying the scope of the meltdown, less than fifty ARS auctions
failed between 1984 and 2007, while 536 failed on a single day in March, 2008,
and nearly 1000 failed in a three-day period in February 2008. 39
The ripple effect of the mortgage crisis first killed the ratings and then the
demand for variable-rate bonds, forcing a dramatic spike in interest rates. 4
Interest rates on ARS that reset weekly increased 6.41 percent in March 2008
from the prior year's average of 3.89 percent.4 ' ARS bonds issued by the
Sacramento County sewer system increased from a low of 1.35 to 12 percent in
March 2008.2 The increases placed enormous pressure on the governments and
agencies required to pay these interest rates.43 Issuers sought a way to take their
bonds off the market until the situation calmed.44
B. Legal Background
Municipalities and public agencies that wish to pull their bonds off the
market must comply with both federal securities regulations and state laws
governing public bonds. 5 When bond issuers began attempting to repurchase
their bonds, attorneys advised them that SEC regulations might not permit their
repurchase.46 This was largely due to concern following a prior thirteen million
dollar fine levied against banks for unauthorized bidding on ARS. 47 Numerous
38. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITfEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 5,
2008).
39. See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note I (stating that there were almost 1,000 failures from February 12
through February 15 of 2008); McDonald, supra note 35 (stating that 521 failures occurred on March 4);
McDonald, supra note 6 (stating that less than 50 failures occurred from 1984 to 2007).
40. See generally John Hill, More Local Agencies Caught in Bond Tunnoil: Failed Auctions Raise the
Cost of Borrowing for SMUD, Placer and El Dorado Services, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 2008, at AI (noting
that cities and agencies are being squeezed by higher interest rates); Saskal, supra note 5 (stating that BATA
and similar agencies must cut services or raise fees if they continue paying high interest rates).
41. Marois, supra note 3.
42. Hill, supra note 40.
43. See, e.g., Letter from Jan Schori, Gen. Manager, Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., to Mike Machado,
Senator, Cal. State Senate (Mar. 4, 2008) [hereinafter Schori Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(describing the need for SB 344 due to the impact of increased bond interest rates); Wiltshire Letter, supra note
18 (same); Letter from Steve Heminger, Executive Dir., Metro. Transp. Comm'n, to Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor, Cal. State (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Heminger Letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(same).
44. See Wiltshire Letter, supra note 18 (stating that municipalities and agencies look for options for
obtaining relief from the high interest rates).
45. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 43607-18 (West Supp. 2008) (outlining the requirements for bond
authorization); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2008) (providing federal securities regulation of municipal bonds).
46. Lynn Hume, SEC's ARS Guidance Pending, BOND BUYER, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www. bondbuyer.
con/printthis.html?id=200803109H9UTW58 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
47. Id.
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Members of Congress wrote the SEC requesting clarification on the issue.48 This
prompted the SEC to issue a notice explicitly providing that an issuer may legally
repurchase its own bonds, provided they comply with disclosure requirements
intended to prevent market manipulation 4 9
California law regulates the process by which bonds are authorized and
issued by municipalities and public agencies.50 While California law does not bar
a municipality or agency from repurchasing its own bonds, prior to Chapter 3, the
law was unclear as to whether the repurchase of the bonds would extinguish the
debt.'
III. CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3 clarifies that a state or local government may repurchase bonds
issued by itself or others on its behalf without automatically canceling or
extinguishing the debt. 2 Chapter 3 does not alter the contractual terms for the
issuance of the bonds. 3 Therefore, the debt represented by the bond remains valid
and outstanding irrespective of the fact that the issuer repurchased it. 4
Consequently, issuers who wish to extinguish bonds in accordance with the terms
of the bonds may still do so."
IV. ANALYSIS
After California Treasurer Bill Lockyer sponsored Chapter 3, the Legislature
overwhelmingly passed it, giving municipalities and public agencies the
flexibility to navigate the breakdown of the variable-rate market. 6 Prior to
48. See Lynn Hume, Sen. Schumer Joins Chorus for SEC Reform on Auction-Rate Securities, BOND
BUYER, Mar. 5, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.com/printthis.html?id=20080304KF3BVTGC (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that Senator Schumer and other lawmakers lobbied the SEC for regulatory
changes).
49. See generally I.R.S. Notice 2008-41, 2008-15 I.R.B. 742 (assuring that repurchase with proper
disclosure is permitted).
50. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 43607-18 (West Supp. 2008) (covering all aspects of bond
authorization).
51. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Existing law is
unclear about whether the purchase or other acquisition of bonds by the bond issuer represents an
extinguishment of the bond debt.").




56. See AssEMIBLY FLOOR VOTE, UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 10, 2008) (noting that Chapter 3 passed
70-3); SENATE FLOOR VOTE, UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 24, 2008) (noting that Chapter 3 passed 33-1);
SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Purpose of the Bill: To allow the
state and local government bond issuers to repurchase some or all of their outstanding bonds without
extinguishing the debt, in order to give these entities the flexibility to reoffer the debt to the bond market on
more favorable terms."); see also Press Release. Senator Michael Machado, Relief for Municipal Bond Issuers
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Chapter 3, however, municipalities and public agencies trapped in the variable-
rate bond market had no good options. If they chose to keep their bonds on the
market, they faced soaring interest rates 7 If they pulled their bonds off the
market by repurchasing them, they received no guarantee that the repurchase
would not extinguish the bonds. 8 Chapter 3, though only a sentence long, gives
municipalities the flexibility to pull their bonds off the market, protects
repurchased bonds from extinguishment, and respects the terms of the bonds. 9
Chapter 3's primary supporters were those most directly affected by the
variable-rate demand marketi ° The California State Treasurer sponsored Chapter
3, which also received letters of support from municipalities and public agencies
in dire need of fiscal relief from soaring interest rates.61 Chapter 3's supporters
achieved near unanimous consensus in the legislature on its passage due to the
clear negative consequences of inaction and because the bill was sufficiently
62narrow to address only this particular issue. However, Chapter 3's narrow focus
may be its biggest drawback, since the cause of the breakdown in the variable-
rate bond market is due to systemic issues in the credit market and Chapter 3
provides only a single method of coping with a single symptom of systemic
63problems.
A. The Potential Harm of Inaction
When Chapter 3 was introduced, the variable-rate bond market was in
disarray, placing cities in dire need of fiscal relief and forcing interest rates to
rise to unanticipated highs.64 The harm in having bonds left on the market is fairly
Passes Legislature (Mar. 24, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the legislature passed
the bill with the specific intent to give bond issuers flexibility to repurchase bonds and reoffer it at a later date).
57. See generally McDonald, supra note 6 (noting that soaring interest rates are taking a toll on
municipalities and public agencies that issued variable-rate bonds).
58. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Existing law is
unclear about whether the purchase ... of bonds by the bond issuer represents an extinguishment of the bond
debt.").
59. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 5925 (enacted by Chapter 3) (stating that in a single sentence that
repurchasing the bond does not extinguish it, thus opening the way for cities to repurchase bonds without the
consequences of cancelation); Heminger Letter, supra note 43 (stating that the MTC supported Chapter 3
because it provided options to cities and agencies).
60. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 8 (Mar. 19, 2008) (listing supporters of
Chapter 3, such as California Treasure Bill Lockyer, the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District, the Eastern
Municipal Water District, and the Center for Responsible Lending).
61. See id. (listing supporters of Chapter 3).
62. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 1 (Mar. 5,
2008) (stating that the bill only clarifies extinguishment issues and preserves terms of bonds as they currently
exist); Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 ("We need to act now to help taxpayers avoid further financial harm.").
63. See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 1 ("The failed auctions are tied to and exacerbating the larger
problems in the financial markets."). See generally Bajaj & Story, supra note 2 (describing larger credit crisis as
it relates to meltdown in mortgage market).
64. See generally McDonald, supra note 6 (increasing interest rates resulting for failures in the variable-
rate bond market wreaking havoc on bond issuer's budgets).
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simple and straightforward. Put plainly, municipalities and public agencies
cannot afford to pay the increasing interest rates without increasing fees and
taxes or cutting services. 6 Supporters, such as the Sacramento Municipal Utilities
District, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and California Hospital
Association, insisted that their debt be restructured to avoid severe financial
hardship.66 There was therefore a broad consensus that a solution such as Chapter
3 would be required to avoid possible disruptions of public services and
skyrocketing costs to taxpayers. 67
If a city repurchased its own bonds, it would face another potential peril to its
financial health. Prior to Chapter 3, California law was unclear as to whether a
bond issuer would legally extinguish the debt represented by a bond by
repurchasing the bond. 68 Avoiding extinguishment is critical for several reasons.
Under California law and the terms of variable-rate bonds, extinguishment may
impose significant costs on the municipalities and public agencies that issued the
bonds. 69 Further, state law requires that public bonds receive proper authorization
through approval by the city legislature and then a public vote.7 ° If extinguished,
the bond might need to be reauthorized for reissuance at a later date, requiring
cities to go through the time-consuming and expensive process of bond
authorization again.7' Additionally, extinguishment would terminate the contract
for the bond insurance and cause termination penalties on the bond to kick in.72
As a result, bond issuers would have to bear the cost of the penalties and the new
insurance policies before they could reissue the bonds.73 The difficulty and cost
of reauthorizing bonds, purchasing insurance, and paying termination penalties
are substantial obstacles to municipalities and public agencies seeking to
repurchase their bonds.74
65. See Saskal, supra note 5 (stating that BATA, which faces the same situation as many other public
agencies, would have difficulty maintaining service level without raising fees if something is not done to
restructure their bond debt); Wiltshire Letter, supra note 18 (describing how local governments are stressed by
extraordinary interest rates).
66. See Letter from David van der Griff, Legislative Advocate, Cal. Hosp. Ass'n, to Mike Machado,
Senator, Cal. State Senate (Mar. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Griff letter] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(expressing the need to restructure their debt); Heminger Letter, supra note 43 (same); Schori Letter, supra note
43 (same).
67. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR VOTE, UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 10, 2008) (showing that Chapter 3 passed
70-3); SENATE FLOOR VOTE, UNOFFICIAL BALLOT (Mar. 24, 2008) (showing that Chapter 3 passed 33-1);
SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 8 (Mar. 19, 2008) (listing no opposition to the bill).
68. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Existing law is unclear
about whether the purchase ... of bonds by the bond issuer represents an extinguishment of the bond debt.").
69. Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 ("Debt extinguishment has costly and problematic consequences.").
70. See generally CAL. GOv'T CODE § 43607-16 (West Supp. 2008) (detailing how bonds are authorized
and regulating the elections to authorize them).
71. SENATE FLOOR, COMMnTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 19, 2008); Lockyer Letter, supra note 10.
72. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 19,2008).
73. Id.
74. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 ("Debt extinguishment has costly and problematic
consequences.").
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Extinguishment might also negatively affect the demand for bonds by
interfering with the bonds' tax-exempt status.75 Part of the reason municipal
bonds are so attractive to investors is that they are tax-exempt, and so retaining
their tax exempt status is important for cities hoping to resell the bonds in the
future. 6 Extinguishment might terminate public bonds' tax-exempt status and
would thus severely decrease demands for public bonds once they are reissued.77
But for Chapter 3, municipalities and public agencies would have to choose
between facing soaring interest rates and risking extinguishment.8 Chapter 3 may
result in significant savings because it allows municipalities and public agencies
to avoid both scenarios by repurchasing their own bonds with no risk of
extinguishment.79 Chapter 3 received overwhelming bipartisan support, in part
because it protects basic public services and result in significant savings to the
state. 80
B. The Narrow Scope of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 has a narrow focus because it is intended to provide a specific
method of coping with a particular problem.8' The breakdown in the variable-rate
market was caused by a of lack liquidity and not by cities and agencies defaulting
12on their debts. Thus, Chapter 3 does nothing to upset the terms of bonds or
disrupt existing debt by explicitly stating that the terms of the bonds will still
govern them.8 3 Rather, Chapter 3 provides assurances that the preferred method
of coping with the credit crisis-repurchasing existing bonds-will not result in
the extinguishment of the debt.84 Chapter 3 makes only a minor change, one
75. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 19, 2008).
76. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 5,
2008) (investors seek municipal bonds because they are safe, liquid, and tax-exempt).
77. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 19,2008); Lockyer Letter, supra note 10.
78. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) (noting that existing
law is unclear regarding the extinguishment of the bond debt); McDonald, supra note 6 (stating that cities with
bonds face extremely high interest rates).
79. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMI'TEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 1-2 (Mar. 5,
2008) ("[There are u]nknown, potentially major savings ... to state and local government issuers of variable
rate bonds.").
80. See EMWD Letter, supra note 5 (stating that bond costs must be reduced to assure the maintenance
of vital services in a cost effective manner); Press Release, Senator Michael Machado, supra note 56 (stating
that the Legislature passed Chapter 3 because of the pressing need to reduce the costs of servicing outstanding
bonds).
81. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 ("While [Chapter 3] will facilitate the repurchase [of] outstanding
bonds, it does not change any covenants of the bonds. All terms and conditions.., remain in place and cannot
be altered.").
82. Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 1 ("'This is not a credit event, this is a liquidity event."' (quoting Jon
D. Maier, Merrill Lynch analyst)).
83. See generally Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 (stating that the purpose of Chapter 3 is to give issuers
greater flexibility to repurchase and then reoffer bonds while preserving all the terms and conditions of the
bond.).
84. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 5925 (enacted by Chapter 3).
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which does not upset existing law, but rather clarifies a previously unclear point
regarding extinguishment. 5 As a result, with the exception of this single
clarification, Chapter 3 preserves the status quo of California law and public
policy.
8 6
However, Chapter 3 is a small fix designed to address only one aspect of a
wider problem in the credit market.87 The breakdown of the variable-rate bond
market was caused by larger forces emanating from a national credit crisis.88 A
significant part of the national credit crisis was due to issues and policies that
extend far beyond California, such as increasingly complex and risky credit
schemes that went unregulated and unchecked for years.89 Because the credit
market is more integrated than ever, breakdowns in one area, such as mortgages,
can affect other areas of the credit market, such as municipal bonds.9 Therefore,
so long as the base issues plaguing the credit market go unresolved, subsequent
problems will continue to arise and more Chapter 3s will be needed to put out
fires as they arise.9' What makes Chapter 3 effective-its focus and bipartisan
support-may also demonstrate its limitations: the persistence of the economic
and financial issues at the core of the credit crisis. To truly resolve the issues
raised by Chapter 3, it is necessary to look beyond bonds, and beyond California,
and instead look to the larger issues facing the credit market.92
V. CONCLUSION
As the twin evils of soaring interest rates and extinguishment closed in and
nearly trapped municipalities and agencies, Chapter 3 was a necessary measure to
85. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITT-EE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2008) ("Existing law is
unclear about whether the purchase ... of bonds by the bond issuer represents an extinguishment of the bond
debt.").
86. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 (noting the limited impact of Chapter 3). See generally ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344 (Mar. 5, 2008) (providing no indication of
a change in law and policy beyond resolving the question of extinguishment); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 344 (Mar. 19, 2008) (same).
87. See De La Torre Letter, supra note 11 (requesting the addition of an urgency clause because of the
urgent nature of the bill). See generally Bajaj & Story, supra note 2 (describing a larger credit crisis as it relates
to the meltdown in the mortgage market).
88. Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 1 (noting that the financial markets are tied to the failed ARS
auctions).
89. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 3 (Mar. 19, 2008) (stating that the bond
crisis precipitated from spillover of the mortgage crisis). See generally Bajaj & Story, supra note 2 (explaining
that major cause of mortgage meltdown was the increasingly complex and risky finance and credit devices).
90. See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note I (noting the connection with the financial markets).
91. See Dakin Campbell, Credit Crunch Hits Variable Rate Market, BOND BUYER, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.bondbuyer.comarticle.html?id=20080228MDVURAHW (on file with the McGeorge Law Reviev)
(noting that the bond crisis is a secondary effect of the credit crunch, which is caused by larger problems).
92. See Bajaj & Story. supra note 2 (stating that the causes behind the credit crunch are large and
systemic).
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give bond issuers a safe escape path.93 Because bond issuers are not unwilling or
unable to pay their outstanding debts, allowing the extinguishment of bonds
would impose significant needless costs on taxpayers through the reauthorization
of bonds, termination of insurance, termination penalties, and the re-certification
of the reissued bonds as tax exempt. 94 However, prior to Chapter 3, the only
alternative to risking the consequences of extinguishment was to pay the
extraordinarily high interest rates, which also imposed unnecessary costs on
taxpayers and threatened essential public services. 95 Chapter 3 provides a safe
escape path by allowing public-bond issuers the ability to avoid unnecessary
costs of extinguishment or soaring interest rates, while continuing to hold them to
the obligations represented by the bonds.96 However, the cause of the bond crisis
goes beyond what Chapter 3 and California alone can resolve;97 while Chapter 3
provides an important fix to an urgent problem, it does not resolve the root cause
of the problems in the variable-rate bond market.9"
93. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 (describing the need for Chapter 3).
94. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 344, at 1-2 (Mar. 5,
2008) (describing the fiscal impact as "potentially major savings"); SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
SB 344, at 5 (Mar. 19, 2008) (describing the consequences of extinguishment).
95. See Wiltshire Letter, supra note 18 (stating that Chapter 3 is needed to escape a market plagued by
extraordinary interest rates).
96. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 10 (stating that Chapter 3 gives issuers options but does not alter the
terms of the bond).
97. See Creswell & Bajaj, supra note 1 (stating that the problems in the variable-rate bond market are
related to the fallout of the national credit crunch that began in the mortgage market).
98. Since the writing of this article there have been substantial developments in many of the areas
discussed in this piece. As this article goes to press, President Obama has been inaugurated and has begun to
address the "credit crisis" that precipitated the creation of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP),
commonly known as "the bailout." See Perry Bacon, Jr., Obama Lobbies for 2nd Half of Bailout, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 2009, at A4 (noting that President Obama encouraged legislators to "back the spending of the funds
remaining in the Troubled Asset Relief Program and a separate stimulus package estimated at $800 billion.").
This article has pointed to several systemic problems, not addressed by Chapter 3, which posed threats to the
stability of the capital markets. See supra Parts II.A & IV.B. To some degree, the concerns this article raises
about the potential of systemic problems threatening a large scale disruption of the credit market have been
bome out by the credit crisis that is sure to occupy a substantial part of President Obama's first term. See id.
(discussing President Obama's approach to the economic crisis); Louis Uchitelle, Pain Spreads as Credit Vise
Grows Tighter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al ("The latest outgrowth of the housing crisis ... threatens to
gradually corrode economic activity on Main Street, mainly by disabling the credit on which so many everyday
transactions depend .... ).
